



There is a near universal consensus that the bearers of moral responsibility are the 
individuals we identify with proper names. I suggest that if we take the exercise of agency 
as a guide to the identification of agents, we may find that agents sometimes extend into 
the world: they may be constituted by several individuals and/or by institutions. These 
extended agents may be responsible for morally significant outcomes. I argue that 
institutions or extended agents may also be responsible for the failure of individuals to 
satisfy the epistemic conditions on moral responsibility. Individuals may believe 
virtuously but falsely, due to the way in which cues to reliability are socially distributed. I 
conclude by suggesting that a focus on individual responsibility may have distracted us 
from the urgent task of reforming the institutional actors responsible for widespread 
ignorance about morally significant facts.
Introduction
With few exceptions, work on moral responsibility in the Anglophone world is resolutely 
individualist.1 The individual is not merely the primary unit of analysis and bearer of 
value; for the most part, individualism is taken for granted to such an extent that 
philosophers are no more aware of their individualism than fish are of the water in which 
they swim. In this paper, I will suggest that concerns about agency may pull apart from 
concerns about agents, when ‘agents’ are identified with individuals (i.e., human 
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organisms, with boundaries defined by their skin). Put another way, I will suggest that if 
we identify agents with the loci of agency, we will sometimes find that agents are not 
identical to individuals: they may be constituted by individuals, or parts of individuals, 
together with extra-individual objects and entities, including other individuals (cf. Rovane 
1998). Since it is agents, understood as loci of agency, who are (very plausibly) the bearers 
of responsibility, both our normative interests in the distribution of obligations and of 
blame and our explanatory and predictive interests in the causes of changes in the world 
should lead us to abandon individualist presumptions in favour of a focus on agency, 
whenever and wherever we find it.2
Changing our focus from biological individuals to a more inclusive way of understanding 
the loci of agency is, I claim, justified on grounds that are conceptual and normative. It is 
justified on conceptual grounds because we cannot understand individual agency except 
by situating individuals within broader contexts (especially, though not only, the broader 
contexts of the other agents who constitute the social groups to which they belong). We 
cannot, that is, hope to understand responsible agency by developing accounts of 
individual agency, on the one hand, and collective agency, on the other.3 Individual 
agency is dependent on the social context in which individuals are embedded, both for its 
genesis and its continued existence. Individuals owe their powers and their limitations to 
stable collectives as well as much smaller and perhaps transitory groupings (even 
groupings as small as a dyad) and only by understanding this context can we understand 
how their agency is realized, the constraints upon it, and the ways in which agents may 
reasonably be expected to exercise it.
The change of focus from biological individuals to the broader contexts in which 
individuals are situated is justified on normative grounds for several reasons but a 
principal justification is the corrective role it can play in identifying how (alongside other 
resources) institutions distribute individual-level blameworthiness. Agents who perform 
wrongful acts while satisfying standard individual level criteria for blameworthiness very 
often have fewer resources (psychological and financial) and less (in the way of resources 
2 I am a moral responsibility skeptic (see Levy 2011). However, normative concerns other than 
concerns over blame and praise—concerns, for example, with who is capable of responding to 
reasons and for whom respect for agency requires the presentation of reasons—closely track 
necessary (though for me not sufficient) conditions for the ascription of moral responsibility. 
Throughout this paper, I will write as if agents could justifiably be held morally responsible for 
their actions, rather than allow my own views to obtrude. In so doing, I will attempt to identify a 
set of conditions which are genuinely important for agency on my view and which ought to be 
held to be central for responsibility by those who are not skeptics.
3 There is a rich and growing literature on collective responsibility; see Sepinwall (2016) for a 
review, focused on the responsibility of corporations. This literature has significantly advanced 
our understanding of how collectives can exercise agency and the conditions under which the 
collective might be said to be culpable, but is not intended to address my primary concern: how 
individual agency is dependent on its social context, including the way in which agents are 
embedded in collectives, and the extent to which individual powers of agency are dependent 
on, or even partially constituted by, this context.













and social standing) to lose from punishment than those who do not, and these facts 
about them are explained by how resources are socially distributed. They have less self-
control, for instance (self-control is correlated with socio-economic status, and the neural 
mechanisms for this fact are slowly being elucidated (Hackman, Farah & Meaney 2010)). 
They are subjected to a double dose of unfairness: first they are positioned socially and 
psychologically such that they face greater incentives to crime and have less capacity to 
resist these incentives, then they are blamed and punished when they fail to resist. 
Addressing the enormous and growing disparities within developed countries requires the 
redistribution of resources of many kinds, but a heavy emphasis on “personal 
responsibility” is a barrier to the policies that would lead to such redistribution. If we 
come to see that individual responsibility is itself frequently distributed, and refocus our 
attention on the collectives and institutions that are the agents of the reproduction of 
inequality, we may be better placed to allocate blame and to enact better policies (both the 
official policies formulated by political and social organizations and the informal policies 
which govern our behaviour toward one another).
In the first half of the paper, my focus will be on the locus of agency, and on questions 
concerning how it is exercised. Roughly, this half focuses on what is often called the 
control condition on moral responsibility, and its purpose is to clear the way for 
refocusing our concern with responsibility from individuals to broader contexts, 
especially the contexts provided by collectives. I will argue on conceptual grounds that the 
focus on individuals abstracted from their contexts is unjustified, showing that the kinds 
of capacities that have plausibly been held to be sufficient for moral responsibility may be 
possessed by supra-agential aggregates (constituted of several agents, of agents embedded 
in institutional contexts, or of agents and artifacts).4 In the second half of the paper, I turn 
to the other condition on moral responsibility that is often identified: the epistemic 
condition.5 If considerations concerning the control condition force us to give up an 
exclusive focus on agents understood as individuals, there is no principled reason why we 
ought to retain it when assessing whether the epistemic condition is satisfied, and by 
whom it is satisfied. Broadening our perspective allows us to broaden the range of 
individuals and institutions who are obligated to satisfy the epistemic condition and who 
4 The idea that agency may supervene on individuals plus things in the world builds on the 
extended mind hypothesis; the hypothesis that mind may extend beyond the skull and into the 
world; see Clark and Chalmers (1998). Clark and Chalmers argue that external artifacts 
sometimes play functional roles in cognition analogous (or even identical) to the functional role 
of brain mechanisms and therefore should be seen as partially constituting minds. Agency, in 
turn, is dependent on cognition: action is guided by representations of the world. The view 
discussed here differs from the extended mind hypothesis not only in focusing on agency and 
not mind, but also in focusing on how other individuals and social institutions—as well as or 
instead of artifacts—may constitute agency.
5 In Levy (2011), I argue that the control and epistemic conditions are not independent: rather, 
the epistemic condition is at least in important part a condition that must be satisfied in order for 















may be held responsible if it is not satisfied. In the conclusion, I draw the two threads of 
the paper together, suggesting that we might best identify the agents responsible for 
failures to satisfy the epistemic condition by reference to the locus of agency, rather than 
preconceived ideas about who agents are. We may thereby find that the obligations to 
bring it about that individuals are better informed are themselves as truly social—falling 
on social institutions and governments, for example—as are the agents who bring about 
significant changes in the world.
1. Agency: Individual and Extra-Individual
The past two decades have seen a revival of interest in debates over the control condition 
on free will and moral responsibility. Incompatibilists—those who maintain that free will 
and moral responsibility are incompatible with causal determinism—have developed new 
lines of attack against their compatibilist counterparts, while compatibilists have 
developed sophisticated accounts of agency to ward off these attacks (see Kane 1996; 
Fischer and Ravizza 1998; Clarke 2003; Steward 2012; Vihvelin 2013; Pereboom 2014 for 
some of the many highlights of the debate in its agency-focused incarnation). These 
debates have been fruitful: they have illuminated essential aspects of human agency and 
led to a better understanding of how it can be constrained and undermined. But the 
accounts of agency developed by compatibilists and libertarians alike share a commitment 
to individualism that dramatically and, I think unjustifiably, limits their scope. They are 
silent on how agency is supported and even partially realized by a scaffold that extends 
beyond our skins, and therefore on the extra-agential, deeply social, conditions which 
may make the difference between responsibility and excuse.
Let me illustrate this individualist commitment with a discussion of a recent debate 
between compatibilists and incompatibilists. Recent controversy has often centred on 
manipulation cases (some philosophers believe that manipulation arguments constitute 
the central difficulty facing compatibilism; see Mele 2006). In brief, arguments based on 
manipulation cases proceed as follows: a scenario is presented in which one agent covertly 
manipulates another in a manner that leaves the manipulated agent satisfying whatever 
set of conditions a compatibilist might adduce as sufficient for freedom, but which is 
supposed to be intuitively responsibility-subverting nevertheless. Having generated the 
intuition that an agent may be unfree despite satisfying plausible compatibilist conditions 
on free will, the incompatibilist then proceeds to argue that there is no relevant difference 
between being covertly manipulated to act in this way and being determined to act in the 
same way. Perhaps the manipulation case that has attracted the most attention is Derk 
Pereboom’s Four-Case Argument (Pereboom 2001; Pereboom 2014), which has the virtue 
(among others) of making the parallel between manipulation and determinism very clear.
In Case One of the Four-Case Argument, Plum is manipulated into murdering Ms. White 
for rationally egoistic reasons, by neuroscientists who use very advanced technology to 
produce his moment to moment states. But Plum nevertheless satisfies plausible 
compatibilist conditions on free will. He does not, for instance, experience an irresistible 
desire, and his reasoning is consistent with his character (he is frequently manipulated 













into acting for rationally egoistic reasons, though he also often acts for moral reasons). He 
endorses his first-order desire to kill Ms. White and he satisfies conditions on reasons-
responsiveness and reactivity (his reasoning processes would recognize reasons, including 
some moral reasons, to do otherwise, were they presented, and there are possible 
scenarios in which he would actually do otherwise in response to such reasons).6
Nonetheless, Pereboom claims that it is intuitive that Plum is not responsible in Case One: 
the manipulation undermines his freedom.
Pereboom then proceeds to construct three further cases. In the first two, Plum is 
manipulated into killing Ms. White as before and for the same reasons, but each case is 
less outlandish and closer to an ordinary case involving wrongdoing in a deterministic 
world than its predecessor. In Case Two, Plum is not locally manipulated, as in Case One. 
Rather, he has been created by neuroscientists who have “programmed” him to weigh 
reasons egotistically (though not exclusively so), such that in the circumstances in which 
he finds himself he is causally determined to form a desire to kill Ms. White and to act on 
it. As before, the desire is not irresistible, Plum endorses it and the mechanisms upon 
which he acts are moderately reasons-responsive. In Case Three, Plum has been 
indoctrinated from infancy in such a way that he often (though not exclusively) acts for 
egotistical reasons, such that he is determined in the situation in which he finds himself to 
form a desire to kill Ms. White and to act on it. In Case Four, Plum is not manipulated at 
all: rather, he is an ordinary agent in a deterministic world, who often (though not 
exclusively) acts for egotistical reasons, such that he is causally determined in the situation 
in which he finds himself to form a desire to kill Ms. White and to act on it.
Pereboom argues that if one accepts that Plum in Case One is not responsible—and one 
should, he maintains—then one should also accept that Plum is not responsible in Case 
Two either. After all, he points out, the difference between the cases consists merely in 
when the manipulation occurs. But if one accepts that Plum is not responsible in Case 
Two, Pereboom argues, one should also think he is not responsible in Case Three, since it 
differs from Case Two only in how Plum’s mental states were created. Indoctrination need 
not be less constraining than neural manipulation, after all, so it is hard to see why it 
ought to undermine moral responsibility any the less. But, finally, Pereboom argues that if 
one accepts that Plum in Case Three is not morally responsible for killing Ms. White, one 
should accept that Plum in Case Four—which features an ordinary agent acting in a 
deterministic world—also fails to be morally responsible. According to Pereboom, if 
Plum’s mental states and values arose by chance or without anyone intending them, he 
6 By building in these stipulations, Pereboom aims to ensure that Plum satisfies the conjunction 
of conditions on moral responsibility set down by a variety of leading theorists. The stipulation 
that Plum endorses the first-order desire on which he acts, for instance, ensures that he satisfies 
the conditions that Frankfurt (1971) influentially advances; the stipulation that Plum would 
respond and react to some reasons to do otherwise, including moral reasons, in counterfactual 















would be no more responsible than he is in a world in which he has been manipulated 
into having them. Accepting that Plum is not responsible in Case Four, however, is 
accepting that compatibilism is false: ordinary agents cannot be morally responsible in 
deterministic worlds.
It is tempting to reply to the manipulation argument by trying to identify a difference 
between the manipulated agent and ordinary agents in deterministic worlds. McKenna 
(2008) calls this kind of move a soft-line reply to these cases. He argues that soft-line 
replies will ultimately fail: even if we succeed in demonstrating a responsibility-relevant 
difference between an agent who features in a manipulation case and the kinds of agents 
whom compatibilists think are morally responsible for their actions in a deterministic 
world, the incompatibilist can simply build that condition into their revised manipulation 
argument. The only condition the compatibilist could cite that the incompatibilist cannot 
bring on board is the stipulation that the agent not be manipulated, but that stipulation 
looks ad hoc and question-begging without an account of why manipulation undermines 
moral responsibility but determinism does not.
McKenna therefore advocates a hard-line reply to manipulation cases: rather than deny 
that the agents who feature in such cases are relevantly similar to determined agents, he 
denies that manipulation necessarily undercuts responsible agency. This bullet-biting 
maneuver requires us to accept that one agent may manipulate another into performing 
an action for which that second agent is nevertheless fully responsible (which does not 
entail, of course, that the manipulator is not also responsible for the action; responsibility 
may be able to be shared without any particular agent’s portion diminishing relative to a 
situation in which responsibility is hers alone). No matter what set of conditions we 
identify as sufficient for moral responsibility, that is, we must accept that manipulators can 
bring it about that agents satisfy these conditions (unless we stipulate a question-begging 
‘no manipulation’ condition). But that fact should not shake our faith in those conditions. 
If they are independently plausible as sufficient conditions on moral responsibility, we 
should accept that agents who satisfy them are morally responsible, even if they are 
manipulated into satisfying them, McKenna maintains.
John Martin Fischer’s enormously (and deservedly) influential account of morally 
responsible agency shares with McKenna’s an emphasis on the rich set of internal 
capacities displayed by most actual adult agents. For Fischer (see Fischer and Ravizza 
1998; Fischer 2006), agents are morally responsible when their actions are caused by 
moderately reasons responsive mechanisms. Roughly, a mechanism is moderately reasons 
responsive if it is capable of recognizing a sufficient range of reasons to do otherwise were 
they presented, and there is at least one possible world in which the mechanism would 
cause the agent to do otherwise in response to such a reason.7 This account is genuinely 
illuminating. We really do discover important things about agents by asking about 
7 Moderate reasons responsiveness also requires the satisfaction of an ownership condition for 
Fischer, because moral responsibility is intrinsically historical. I set that condition aside here.













counterfactuals in precisely the way Fischer suggests. We discover what reasons they are 
capable of recognizing and responding to, and whether there are distinctive gaps in the 
patterns of such responsiveness, and so on. But in the hands of McKenna, Fischer and 
other philosophers, the answers to these questions are gerrymandered to reflect 
individualist commitments.
For Fischer and for McKenna, an agent exemplifies a rich enough set of agential capacities 
and is therefore morally responsible when she herself – understood as the person 
bounded by her skin – remains capable of appropriate response. When manipulation, for 
instance, leaves her unable to respond in that way, she is not responsible. But there is 
another way of dividing up cases. We can ask not about agents, in a way that is guided by 
our intuitions about who or what is an agent, but about agency. Rather than asking, with 
Fischer (for instance), “is the agent appropriately responsive and reactive to reasons?”, we 
might ask “is appropriate responsiveness and reactiveness to reasons exemplified?”. 
Asking that question will yield a different way of picking out agents, and one that might 
be better justified.
To pave the way for this kind of move, it might be worth comparing Pereboom’s Four Case 
Argument with a different thought experiment, Searle’s Chinese Room experiment (Searle 
1980; 1990). That thought experiment features a native English speaker, with no 
knowledge of Chinese, who is locked in the room with a box of Chinese symbols and an 
instruction book. Native Chinese speakers write questions in Chinese and post them 
through a slot in the room. The agent inside the room uses her instruction book to 
produce (to her, meaningless) symbols on a piece of paper, which she then posts back to 
the people outside. The instruction book and database of symbols is so cleverly 
constructed that she is able to intelligently answer any question put to her in Chinese. But 
she understands neither the questions nor the answers she returns. Searle thinks it is 
obvious that the agent inside the room does not understand Chinese; he takes the thought 
experiment to show that rule-governed manipulation of symbols can never be sufficient 
for genuine thinking; syntax alone can never be sufficient for semantics.
One popular reply (or set of replies; here I abstract from the difference between the 
Systems Reply and the Virtual Minds Reply) argues that though the agent inside the room 
does not understand Chinese, there is an agent who does understand it. That agent is 
identical to or supervenes on the system as a whole: the person inside the room, the input 
and output devices, and the internal processes together constitute an agent who 
understands Chinese (see Cole 2014 for discussion). This reply changes our focus from 
agents to agency: from a (possibly arbitrary) focus on loci of agency held to be bounded 
by skins to the identification of appropriate response functionally. This same move is 
available to us in response to manipulation cases, of course. Instead of, or as well as, 
asking whether Plum is responsible, we can ask whether there is agency that meets the 
conditions for responsibility. Is the system composed of Plum and the scientists 
manipulating him appropriately responsive and reactive to reasons? Asking that question 
will help free us from the individualist prejudice, according to which agency is always a 














to identify the actors who play an indispensable role in shaping the physical and natural 
world.
What, besides a taken for granted presumption in favor of individualism, explains why 
philosophers have not asked this question? Perhaps they take it to be inappropriate, for 
reasons centered on pragmatic considerations. A morally significant event has occurred—
Ms. White has been murdered, say—and we want to know if someone is to blame, should 
be punished or have obligations to make amends. There is no one other than Plum and 
other individuals (say the neuroscientists who manipulate him) of whom to ask this 
question. This worry has some force: sometimes there is no agent who can be held to 
account, for pragmatic reasons or because there is no mechanism for holding them to 
account. But there are cases in which this is not true. More importantly, understanding 
the true loci of agency and thereby freeing ourselves from the grip of the individualist 
prejudice clears the way for better policy: if agency is in fact exercised by supra-agential 
aggregates, then understanding the world, and having a chance of shaping it as we would 
like, requires us to focus on such aggregates as well as (and sometimes instead of) 
individuals.
Suppose that the system composed of Plum and the neuroscientists exemplifies moderate 
reasons responsiveness but that neither Plum nor any individual neuroscientist meets 
these conditions. This might occur if, for some reason, no individual was in a position to 
grasp the nature of the actions they helped to bring about, because they each responded to 
a narrow slice of information in such a manner that the ensemble of responses manifested 
moderate reasons responsiveness. We might think that in such a case, we would have 
moral responsibility without an agent that could be blamed, punished or under an 
obligation to make amends. But that’s far from obviously the case. If agency is constituted 
by a set of agents, then there is an entity that might be blamed or otherwise held to 
account. Of course there are practical problems with holding it to account without also 
(unjustifiably) holding the individuals who compose it to account, but these problems are 
familiar and sometimes surmountable. Nations may be held to account even when some 
or all of the individuals who help to constitute them cannot justifiably be; so can 
corporations. There are sometimes ways of holding the supervening agent to account that 
does not harm the composite agents: we may dissolve the supervening agent, for instance. 
I don’t deny that there are very hard problems that may arise, but these are problems we 
face in other cases. They are real problems, I claim: they arise only because agency can be 
composed of other agents, rather than always being dependent on the boundaries defined 
by skin.8
8 There is a further difficulty that may arise in this context that does not arise with regard to 
nations and corporations: individuals like Plum and the neuroscientists might fail to constitute an 
aggregate agent across time. They may constitute a fleeting agent: by the time that anyone 
thinks to hold them to account, they may have dissolved. I grant that this may happen, but it has 
its individual level analogue too (we may sometimes blame agents who are dead, for instance). A 
further worry is that the boundaries of the actual extra-individual agents who actually play an 













It is worth emphasizing that it may happen that both the supervening agent and the 
individuals who compose it exemplify moderate reasons responsiveness. That might be 
the case in some of the iterations of the Four Case Argument, as Pereboom (2001; 2014 ) 
presents it. In some of those cases, the following three propositions may all be true: (1) the 
supervening agent may be appropriately reasons responsive; (2) some or all the 
manipulating neuroscientists are themselves reasons responsive, grasping the nature of 
the action they cause Plum to engage in, and (3) Plum himself is not moderately reasons 
responsive. This kind of case presents us with practical problems, once again, but not with 
any particular theoretical difficulties. The supervening agent may in such a case be held to 
account and so can some, but not others, of the individuals who compose it. Again, there 
may be closely analogous cases involving nations or corporations, since some individuals 
who compose them possess more power and more information with regard to the goals of 
such composite entities than others. Such corporate agents may be required to offer 
recompense or apology. They may be capable of the expression of guilt or shame, or 
analogues thereof; they may be fined or we may refuse to cooperate with them (Bjornsson 
and Hess 2016). In addition, we may expect the individuals who partially constitute them, 
or who benefit from their wrongdoing, to feel shame or guilt.
In the preceding pages, I have offered a (very sketchy) hint as to how we might respond to 
well-known thought experiments in the philosophy of agency, with a view to attempting 
to shake the hold that the exclusively individualist conception of agents has on us. While I 
have suggested, with my asides about nations and corporations, that these hints may have 
real-world implications, it may be that there are few composite entities in the world that 
actually exemplify the rich set of agential powers required by accounts like that of Fischer. 
Very often, individuals act together while failing to constitute a supervening agent. While 
that fact entails that, in these cases, there is no collective entity that is the bearer of moral 
responsibility, the social institutions that distribute powers and resources to individuals—
amorphous and inchoate as they may be—often constitute the external scaffolding on 
which individual powers often depend. We cannot understand individual agency unless 
we understand these institutions and how they confer both powers and limitations on the 
individuals who are embedded within them.
Indeed, the cases in which individuals owe their powers to institutions which are not 
sufficiently integrated or appropriately structured to themselves be responsible collective 
entities are especially interesting, for the following reasons: In those cases in which it is 
true that, had these institutions possessed sufficient structure and feedback mechanisms 
to appropriately be held to account, we would blame them and not the individuals who 
are embedded in, or dependent on, them, those individuals are themselves blameless. The 
essential role in distributing powers to individuals are always shifting, making it hard to draw 
boundaries. This fact, too, may make it hard to identify an appropriate target to call to account. 
However, these barriers will not be encountered in every case. More importantly, they should not 
distract us from the non-punitive responses that are the most important: changes in policies, 














lack of responsible agency at the collective level does not bring it about that individuals 
possess it. If an organization is so structured that the individuals who partially constitute 
it lack access to sufficient information about their options or the effects of their choices to 
be morally responsible as individuals (and they are not responsible for their lack of 
knowledge), then they are blameless regardless of whether there is some other entity that 
can be blamed appropriately.
Consider, for example, the persistence of racism in Western nations. There is no doubt 
that the racist attitudes of individuals (conscious and unconscious) play an important role 
in the sustaining of systematic inequality and injustices. But structural and institutional 
racism may be as, or more, important than racist attitudes in producing harms, and these 
kinds of racism do not depend on the persistence of racist attitudes (Haslanger 2004; 
Glasgow 2009). Nevertheless, institutions are maintained in existence by the actions of 
individuals. Non-racist individuals may sustain racist institutions, when (for instance) 
they do not possess sufficient information to grasp the systematic effects of their actions. 
University admission offices, for example, might apply criteria that seem ‘color blind’, 
without realizing that they filter admissions in ways that favor those people who possess 
superior (that is, preferred, for arbitrary reasons) cultural capital, rather than superior 
ability or knowledge. Even the blameworthy racist individual may not be blameworthy for 
the systematic effects of the institutions they help to sustain: being blameworthy for a 
token racist action need not entail being blameworthy for the pattern of actions which it 
helps to constitute.
More generally, I hope that by shaking the grip of the individualist view of agency, I 
thereby make readers more sensitive to other ways in which agency may be deeply 
dependent on external scaffolding. It is with this mind that I turn from a consideration of 
the control condition to the epistemic condition. Knowledge and the capacities to acquire 
it are themselves socially distributed, and the institutions (causally or morally) responsible 
for this distribution are appropriate loci of responses that ensure that it is better 
distributed and that significant truths come to be known. Further, the institutions 
responsible for individual-level failures of the epistemic condition may themselves 
constitute genuinely supra-individual agents.
2. The Epistemic Condition Beyond Individualism
Moral responsibility requires the satisfaction of an epistemic condition: agents who 
exercise control over their behavior may be excused in virtue of the fact that they are 
(non-culpably) ignorant of important facts concerning that behavior. For instance, until 
recently physicians failed to treat peptic ulcers with antibiotics, and thereby may have 
failed to avoid significant harms to many of their patients. But very plausibly they were 
not blameworthy for doing so, because they acted in the light of what they justifiably took 
to be medical knowledge at the time. It wasn’t until Warren and Marshall established in 
the mid 1980s that peptic ulcers were caused by bacteria that it became reasonable to 
expect physicians to use antibiotics as a first-line treatment and (therefore) to blame them 
if they failed to do so.9 Prior to the mid 1980s, physicians failed to be blameworthy for 













their actions when they caused avoidable harms to peptic ulcer patients, because they 
failed to satisfy the epistemic condition on moral responsibility.
Individual physicians are obligated to apply the knowledge that they have learned. They 
are very rarely in a position to test medical claims for themselves. They can collect data on 
treatment and patient outcomes, but for the most part this data is uninformative, for a 
number of reasons. First, general practitioners see too few patients with any particular 
condition to generate statistically significant results (given that differences between 
treatment types are anything short of spectacular). Second, there are too many confounds 
in clinical practice to easily generate useful data through this kind of process: patients 
who suffer from a condition may differ in too many ways for comparisons to be 
meaningful. Third, physicians cannot use placebo controls, and their close involvement 
with individual cases entails vulnerability to cognitive biases, like the confirmation bias. 
Researchers use double blind procedures to avoid these biases, but physicians cannot use 
them.
These facts entail that for most knowledge claims, physicians find themselves at (or near) 
the end of chains of transmission for knowledge claims. They know very many of the 
things they know because they are the beneficiaries of testimony. In fact, almost everyone 
in science knows almost everything they know in very significant part in virtue of 
testimony. Consider the researchers who produce significant new knowledge. They use 
equipment designed by other researchers, which implement algorithms that they may be 
unable to understand. They use statistical techniques they could not have developed. They 
rely for the interpretation of their data on acquired knowledge they take for granted. 
Knowledge production in science is deeply distributed, with each scientist dependent on 
very many others for their capacity to formulate hypotheses, test them and interpret their 
data.
Even within a single laboratory and with regard to a single research finding, knowledge 
production may be deeply distributed. A single paper, for instance, is typically the work of 
multiple authors, each of whom has a different set of skills. Some may have no interest in 
the topic of the paper at all: they are involved nevertheless because of their expertise with 
the equipment used or with the paradigm employed or in statistical analysis. Science has 
depended on the distribution of cognitive labor since its inception, but today the trend is 
toward deeper and deeper distribution of labor. Medical research is often carried out 
today by multiple laboratories in many countries, to ensure that a sufficiently large 
number of sufficiently diverse patients are enrolled and a sufficiently great range of 
9 It is important to distinguish between medical researchers and general practitioners in making 
this claim. It is arguable that some medical researchers ought to have put the bacterial 
hypothesis to more stringent test much earlier; in retrospect, at least, we can see that the 
evidence against the hypothesis was weaker than was widely thought (see Zollman 2010 for 
discussion). However, individual physicians cannot and should not be expected to test 
established medical claims, except in very rare cases; rather, they discharge their epistemic 














expertise is brought to bear on the problem. For cutting edge physics, the distribution of 
cognitive labor is even deeper: the recent paper reporting the detection of the Higgs 
Boson particle had more than 5000 authors (Castelvecchi 2015).
It is in part because science is a deeply distributed enterprise that it is the paradigm of 
successful knowledge production. Individuals alone are not especially impressive at 
generating knowledge, but together they may explore the space of potential hypotheses 
much more successfully and—under truth-conducive conditions—cancel out one 
another’s biases (in particular, the disposition of each of us to seek evidence in favor of a 
hypothesis and overlook evidence that conflicts with it). Diversity in anything that causes 
people to entertain conflicting hypotheses will ensure that one agent’s confirmation bias 
will be compensated for by another’s; each will be motivated to defend their hypothesis, 
and therefore produce arguments that undermine the other hypothesis. Deeper diversity 
(of cultural background, gender, life experience, political orientation) may allow for the 
detection of or compensation for those biases correlated with socio-cultural positioning. 
Whereas an all-male research group might overlook explanations of data that turn on 
women’s agency, say, adding women to the research group may lead to a more thorough 
exploration of the space of hypotheses.10
The distribution of knowledge production is not a necessary evil, but is the key to our 
cognitive success (Mercier and Sperber 2011). Indeed, there is evidence to suggest that the 
cultural distribution of cognitive labor is an evolutionary adaptation: that is how we are 
designed (by nature) to come to understand, and thereby intervene in, the world. It is not 
just now, in the complex society in which we live today, or just with regard to the difficult 
questions that contemporary science faces, that knowledge production must be deeply 
distributed to be successful. In fact, we have always engaged in distributed knowledge 
production. Culture is central to our success as animals, and culture is in very important 
part the embodiment of knowledge accumulated by many individuals over many 
generations.
I use “culture” in the manner defined by Richerson and Boyd (2005, 5): culture is 
information capable of affecting individuals’ behavior that is acquired from other 
members of their species through mechanisms of social transmission like teaching and 
imitation. In human beings (perhaps alone), culture is cumulative: new generations add to 
the stock of transmitted information. Cumulative culture often embodies knowledge that 
is inaccessible to individuals. Consider the very many cultural techniques required for 
survival in a harsh environment, like the Arctic. The indigenous people flourished in this 
environment where well-prepared expeditions could not, despite the advantages of 19th 
century science and the resources of one of the wealthiest empires ever known (Boyd, 
10 Diversity is not sufficient on its own, of course. Groups may fail to outperform individuals at 
deliberation when dissenting individuals are unable to speak or be heard (Sunstein 2005). Too 
often, low status individuals are unable to express their views, or their opinions may be given 
little credibility (Fricker 2007).













Richerson and Heinrich 2011). These expeditions were unable to acquire the knowledge 
needed for survival in this environment; it takes generations for such knowledge to 
accumulate and its range once acquired exceeds the resources of any single individual, 
such that it must be distributed across many people (so not only is its acquisition 
dependent on the work of many people over many generations, but it can be maintained 
only if there are sufficient numbers of individuals to sustain it). Distributed knowledge 
acquisition is not just a fancy innovation that explains the relatively recent scientific 
takeoff; rather, it is one of the special tricks that explain human adaptive success 
(Richerson and Boyd 2005).11
Given that our epistemic success is and always has been dependent on the deep 
distribution of cognitive labor, it is often the case that agents—even agents understood as 
identical to skin-bound individuals—satisfy or fail to satisfy the epistemic condition in 
virtue of their place in such distributed networks. Whether they are in a position to know 
that an action is harmful, for instance, is often dependent on what testimony they have 
received and the reception and assessment of testimony is dependent on social factors. 
Unsurprisingly (given that we are deeply cultural animals), human beings are disposed to 
accept the testimony of others. But our disposition to accept testimony is selective: we are 
sensitive to cues of lack of benevolence toward us and of incompetence in filtering 
testimony (Mascaro and Sperber 2009; Sperber et al. 2010). This disposition is obviously 
adaptive: the use of competence as a filter for reliability enables us to avoid acquiring false 
beliefs, while the use of lack of benevolence as a filter for reliability enables us to avoid 
exploitation by others. But cues for competence and for reliability are themselves 
dependent on social facts. We identify those to be trusted and mistrusted by reference to 
prevailing social norms and we identify competence by reference to socially transmitted 
credentials. Our early relatively promiscuous acceptance of testimony allows us to 
bootstrap our way to being appropriately selective in the testimony we accept: first we 
acquire, primarily from our caregivers, sensitivity to cues for reliability, and then 
subsequently we utilize those cues to acquire further testimony.
11 Kukla (2012) argues that there are deep problems with regard to contemporary science arising 
from the extent to which it is distributed across individuals. No one is in a position to understand 
or to take responsibility for the results of such research, she maintains. As a consequence, there 
is no one who we can hold accountable for its truth claims. Kukla thinks that appeals to 
testimony cannot explain how such claims can be justified, because no one is in a position to test 
these claims for reliability. It may be that a shift in focus from individuals to collectives as loci not 
only of agency but also of knowledge may help to alleviate these concerns. It is worth 
emphasizing that the problem is not new (taboos, for example, may sometimes embody 
genuinely distributed knowledge that no individual is in a position to answer for or even to 
understand) (Henrich and Henrich 2010); and that it has implications that extend well beyond 
concerns for the epistemic status of scientific claims. Distributed knowledge—justified for 
individuals or not—is central to our responsibility, including our individual responsibility. If no 
one can justifiably be held responsible when they cannot individually vouch for knowledge 















These facts entail that false claims, even obviously false claims, can come to be accepted by 
agents who might be said to believe virtuously. Cues to reliability are themselves socially 
distributed: we learn who counts as trustworthy and whose testimony is unreliable. We 
acquire this information in the first instance from those who show us that they are 
competent and trustworthy (caregivers, in the first instance, in most cases), but then we 
acquire them through mechanisms of social transmission like imitation, explicit teaching 
and through subtle cues from those we trust (how they orient themselves in conversation, 
say, to whom they listen attentively and who they interrupt), as well as from the narratives 
with which we are surrounded. All too frequently, these cues are distributed so that many 
true claims are filtered out and false claims filtered in, for example when the true claims 
are promulgated by those who are denigrated as the source of testimony, such as women 
and minorities. When this happens, the speakers suffer epistemic injustice (Fricker 2007) 
at the hands of hearers who may be epistemically virtuous agents. They count as 
epistemically virtuous because they filter claims in response to the cues in a way that has 
the function of increasing reliability, and because they cannot reasonably expect to do 
better by ignoring testimony (again, we are all deeply reliant on testimony for almost all of 
our beliefs).
Consider, for illustration, Allen Buchanan’s description of his lucky escape from the 
racism of the American South during the 1950s and ‘60s. Explicitly and by example, he 
was taught to regard black people as subhuman. Those he had trusted and relied on—
family members, his pastor, his teachers, local government officials, were ‘sources of 
dangerous error, not truth’. It was through the good fortune of leaving this environment 
that he came to be in a position to appreciate the falsehoods for what they are (Buchanan 
2004: 95). Our epistemic capacities are designed (by evolution) to absorb local cultural 
knowledge, because we require such knowledge to cope with our natural and social 
environment. But when toxic falsehoods are promulgated alongside adaptive knowledge, 
we are apt to absorb those too. Filters on testimony are insensitive to the differences 
between truth and falsehood when both are culturally reinforced, and individual 
epistemic virtue is insufficient to avoid potential disaster. In cases like this, individuals 
may perpetrate racist acts but fail to be morally responsible for them: their epistemic bad 
luck entails that they do not satisfy the epistemic condition on moral responsibility.12
These considerations generalize broadly. Consider the politically charged issues that 
divide people within and across countries. Should taxation be higher than it currently is? 
Is climate change a serious challenge to humanity? Should coreligionists be accorded a 
higher moral value than nonbelievers and heretics? Each of these questions is one on 
which some people are recognized as experts and accorded socially mandated credentials 
12 Many philosophers argue that agents like Buchanan’s counterpart, who did not have the good 
luck of escaping his toxic environment, would satisfy the epistemic condition because they 
would (typically) be culpable for their ignorance (see, for example, Moody-Adams (1997); 
FitzPatrick (2008)). Responding to these critics would take us too far afield. I have responded to 
their worries elsewhere (Levy 2003; 2009).













(economists, climate scientists, political pundits, priests, and so on). The great mass of 
humanity has no special expertise on any of these topics and no one is genuinely expert 
on more than a very few. These are not questions that we can easily evaluate for 
ourselves.13 In fact, the impression that many of us do evaluate these questions for 
ourselves is largely an illusion: we evaluate these questions using tools and biases 
(virtuous and vicious) that dispose us to take some sources of evidence seriously and 
dismiss others, and these tools and biases are socially produced and distributed. We must 
and should defer to others on these matters, except where we are capable of genuine 
expertise on them (where genuine expertise requires thousands of hours of learning). 
Epistemically virtuous believers come to have false beliefs on these topics through no fault 
of their own. They therefore non-culpably fail to satisfy the epistemic conditions on moral 
responsibility.
If we are justifiably to hold agents morally responsible for actions which are caused or 
enabled by false beliefs, they must be culpable for having those beliefs. Perhaps there are 
cases in which agents satisfy this condition, but there are very many, significant, cases in 
which they do not, and they do not because of the way in which knowledge claims are 
socially transmitted. Social animals like us, with cognitive faculties designed (by 
evolution) to utilize social cues for truth and falsity, are vulnerable to responsibility-
undermining epistemic luck: when we are in an environment in which morally significant 
falsehoods are promulgated by those who count as epistemic authorities – that is, those 
individuals and institutions that pass the relevant tests for epistemic authority – we are 
unlikely to be able to come to understand that these claims are false. We lack a reasonable 
opportunity to come to better views: either these views are lacking from our environment, 
or they are advocated by individuals who fail the relevant tests for epistemic authority. 
Buchanan was the beneficiary of good epistemic luck, cancelling out the bad epistemic 
luck of his having been socialized in an environment in which epistemic authorities 
promoted (vicious) falsehoods: he found himself in a new, and more truth-conducive, 
social environment.14 In cases like these, there may be some individual agents who are 
blameworthy (perhaps agents who have deliberately brought it about that false claims 
would come to be accepted; see Oreskes and Conway (2010) for examples of individuals 
who may fit this description). However, the great mass of believers probably are not 
blameworthy (at most, they are due only a tiny fraction of the blame which might accrue 
to all of us insofar as we have a role in sustaining the institutions which distribute 
13 Despite the depth of our reliance on the distribution of cognitive labor, we tend to overvalue 
individual reasoning and undervalue group deliberation (see Mercier, et al. 2015).
14 Note that these remarks do not commit me to denying that culpable ignorance is possible. 
Rather, they delimit the circumstances in which ignorance can be culpable: it is a necessary 
condition of culpable ignorance that the agent be presented with what she herself recognizes as 
a genuine opportunity to put her beliefs to the test. Culpable ignorance, on my view (owed to 















testimony and the cues of reliability which filter it). They believe virtuously, but their 
beliefs are false due to the way in which knowledge is socially sustained and distributed.
The mechanisms by which knowledge is socially produced, sustained and transmitted 
often entail that individuals fail to satisfy the epistemic conditions on moral responsibility 
for false belief. When we acquire such beliefs via the virtuous utilization of mechanisms 
designed to equip us for lives in our culture, we often acquire widely shared false beliefs 
alongside genuine knowledge. When we act on these false beliefs, we will (at least often) 
fail to be morally responsible because we do not satisfy the epistemic conditions on moral 
responsibility. The explanation for our ignorance will essentially cite social and cultural 
practices, institutions, and norms.
It does not follow, of course, from the fact that we may fail as individuals to be morally 
responsible for our actions, due to a failure to satisfy the epistemic condition that is itself 
due to forces working at a supra-individual level, that there is some supra-individual 
entity that does satisfy the epistemic condition. In fact, it will at best rarely be the case that 
such an entity exists. My primary aim is to not to identify targets to hold to account, but 
to clear the way for better practices. Focusing on the individual abstracted from her 
structuring, scaffolding and supporting context, as our preoccupation with individual-
level responsibility encourages us to do, is an obstacle to responses that focus on 
restructuring the social environment (think, here, of how corporate resistance to 
commonsense measures to reduce sugar intake advocates that instead we take “personal 
responsibility” for our diets).15 Recognizing that the individual is embedded in complex 
social networks that distribute knowledge paves the way for a focus on the redistribution 
of resources, and on moving beyond blame and searching for evidence-based solutions. 
Traditional theories of responsibility focus us on the individual and her internal capacities 
(to control her actions, to regulate beliefs, to endorse her volitions, or what have you). 
More recent theories extend this concern to the collective and its powers to act and 
regulate itself. This leaves unexplored agents’ embedding in social networks, in power 
relations, in culture: the ways in which the collective form and sustain the individual. We 
cannot fully comprehend responsibility by dividing the territory into the individual, on 
the one hand, and the collective, on the other. We need as well to understand how the 
collective structures the individual. Identifying the social and cultural mechanisms 
responsible for our beliefs reduces the temptation to focus on individuals, and thereby 
enables us to focus our attention where it should be.
Conclusion
In the first half of this paper, I focused on the control condition on moral responsibility. I 
suggested that if we utilize agency as a criterion for identifying agents, we will sometimes 
find that agents are not always identical to individuals, where ‘individuals’ are skin-bound 
15 One example among literally thousands: “Americans need to be more active and take greater 
responsibility for their diets”, according to the CEO of Coca Cola (Kent 2009).













bodies. Instead, agents sometimes extend beyond individuals and into the world. 
Extended agency is not always collective agency: the agent may owe her powers and 
capacities to other individuals and to institutions without coming to constitute a higher-
level entity. Sometimes, the locus of agency dissociates from the person, without thereby 
becoming collective. In the second half of the paper, I turned from the control condition 
to the epistemic condition. I argued that agents may fail to satisfy the epistemic condition 
on moral responsibility because of the way they are socially situated. They may exercise 
their epistemic faculties virtuously but acquire false beliefs because the socially produced 
cues to which these faculties are sensitive promote false beliefs and denigrate true. In this 
concluding section, I will draw the two threads of this paper together.
If the cues to reliability to which our testimonial mechanisms are sensitive dissociate from 
genuine reliability, whose fault is that? It may be no one’s fault: very often there is no agent 
responsible for a state of affairs. But many widely accepted false claims (that global 
warming is not occurring, or is not human induced, or is not a serious problem, for 
instance) arise and are maintained in very important part because of the actions of 
individuals and of institutions that can reasonably be thought to possess and to exercise 
agency. I have already mentioned the “merchants of doubt” who may be individually 
responsible for knowingly promulgating false beliefs. But they could not have succeeded 
without the cooperation of institutions that fail to challenge them or are complicit in their 
behavior.
For a signal instance, take the media. The media gives the merchant of doubt a voice. 
Some media institutions may be identical to merchants of doubt, but they would not be 
taken seriously if many others did not accord the skeptics a degree of respectability out of 
proportion to their epistemic standing, due to the widespread commitment to a norm of 
“balanced reporting”. As this norm is often understood, reporting is balanced only if both 
sides are given an equal hearing. This is a norm that ought to be rejected or reinterpreted 
when we have good reason to think that one side is neither justified in its claims nor 
motivated by the search for truth or by a concern for the wellbeing of ordinary 
individuals. Of course, the media can no more assess the climate science than can other 
non-experts. But it need not do so in order to develop a rubric for giving a hearing to the 
sides: it can refer to the scientific consensus and weight voices accordingly. There is a 
strong scientific consensus on the reality of anthropogenic global warming: many studies 
have found that approximately 97% of relevant experts hold that it is occurring, that it is 
human induced and that it is a very serious problem (Cook et al. 2013; Carlton et al. 
2015). Yet mainstream media organizations give both sides equal, or nearly equal, 
coverage (Boykoff and Boykoff 2004; Theel, Greenberg, and Robbins 2013). Other 
institutions—schools, universities and parliaments, for instance—may be complicit in the 
fact that this situation goes without significant challenge.
There may be a case for holding that some or all of these institutions, perhaps together 
with some individuals, constitute genuine loci of agency, which can be held responsible 
for the fact that many individuals fail to satisfy the epistemic condition. Someone may be 














responsible and who have an obligation to correct the state of affairs, where these agents 
are not identical to any individuals.
Even if these institutions do not constitute agents who may justifiably be held responsible 
for the ignorance of so many, there is a strong case for thinking that they nevertheless play 
a significant role in the structuring of the agency of others—individuals and collectives—
such that correcting the widespread ignorance will require reforming the institutions. The 
almost obsessive focus on the individual as the only locus not only of agency but also of 
responsibility has been counterproductive. It has focused us on arguing with one another, 
on identifying villains and on denigrating those who come to hold false beliefs. If we set 
aside this obsession with individuals, the way may be clear for us to identify the agents 
who are the most important actors on this stage and then in playing our individual and 
distributed parts in bringing them to play it better.16
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